Affiliation:
1. University of Chicago Booth School of Business, 5807 S. Woodlawn Ave., Chicago, IL 60637 (e-mail: )
Abstract
A principal delegates multiple decisions to an agent, who has private information relevant to each decision. The principal is uncertain about the agent's preferences. I solve for max-min optimal mechanisms—those which maximize the principal's payoff against the worst case agent preference types. These mechanisms are characterized by a property I call “aligned delegation”: all agent types play identically, as if they shared the principal's preferences. Max-min optimal mechanisms may take the simple forms of ranking mechanisms, budgets, or sequential quotas. (JEL D44, D83, J16)
Publisher
American Economic Association
Subject
Economics and Econometrics
Cited by
71 articles.
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