Affiliation:
1. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (email: )
2. Bank of Canada (email: )
Abstract
We document considerable scope of heterogeneity within the unemployed, especially when they are divided along eligibility for and receipt of unemployment insurance (UI). We study the implications of this heterogeneity on UI’s insurance-incentive trade-off using a heterogeneous-agent job search model capable of matching the wealth and income differences that distinguish UI recipients from nonrecipients. Insurance benefits are larger for UI recipients who are predominantly wealth poor. Meanwhile, incentive costs are nonmonotonic in wealth because the poorest individuals, who value employment, exhibit weak responses. Differential elasticities imply that accounting for the composition of recipients is material to the evaluation of UI’s insurance-incentive trade-off. (JEL D91, E24, E32, J64, J65)
Publisher
American Economic Association
Subject
General Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Reference47 articles.
1. Eligibility, experience rating, and unemployment insurance take‐up
2. Unemployment insurance take-up rates in an equilibrium search model
3. Labor market policies during an epidemic
4. Birinci, Serdar, and Kurt See. 2023. "Replication Data for: Labor Market Responses to Unemployment Insurance: The Role of Heterogeneity." American Economic Association [publisher], Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor]. https://doi.org/10.3886/E170261V1.
Cited by
3 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献，注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献，订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献