Manipulability of Stable Mechanisms-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Manipulability of Stable Mechanisms

Published:2016-05-01 Issue:2 Volume:8 Page:202-214
ISSN:1945-7669
Container-title:American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
language:en
Short-container-title:American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

Author:

Chen Peter¹,Egesdal Michael²,Pycia Marek³,Yenmez M. Bumin⁴

Affiliation:

1. Booth School of Business, University of Chicago, 5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue, Chicago, IL 60637 (e-mail: )

2. Department of Economics, Harvard University, 1805 Cambridge Street, Cambridge, MA 02138 (e-mail: )

3. Department of Economics, University of California-Los Angeles, 8283 Bunche Hall, Los Angeles, CA 90095 (e-mail: )

4. Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University, 5000 Forbes Avenue, Pittsburgh, PA 15213 (e-mail: )

Abstract

We study the manipulability of stable matching mechanisms and show that manipulability comparisons are equivalent to preference comparisons: for any agent, a mechanism is more manipulable than another if and only if this agent prefers the latter to the former. One important implication is that when agents on one side of the market have unit demand, no stable matching mechanism is less manipulable than another for all agents. (JEL C78, D82)

Publisher

American Economic Association

Subject

General Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Link

https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdf/10.1257/mic.20150035

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