Affiliation:
1. Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto, 105 St. George St., Toronto, ON M5S3E6 (email: )
2. International Business School, Brandeis University, 415 South Street, Waltham, MA 02453 (email: )
Abstract
We model the reporting of sexual misconduct. Individuals underreport misconduct due to strategic uncertainty over whether others will report and corroborate a pattern of behavior. Underreporting occurs if and only if misconduct is widespread. Making sanctions more responsive to reports, raising public awareness of misconduct, implementing confidential holding tanks, and appropriately calibrating damage awards can encourage reporting. However, we also show when such policies are ineffective or backfire. Managers may avoid mentoring subordinates, spilling over into reporting. A holding tank may discourage reporting by raising the bar to access reports. Overall, we highlight several unintended and intended consequences of #MeToo. (JEL D82, D83, J16, K13, K42, M14, M54)
Publisher
American Economic Association
Subject
General Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Cited by
2 articles.
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1. (No) Spillovers in reporting domestic abuse to police;Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A: Statistics in Society;2023-05-24
2. Intimate partner violence and help-seeking: The role of femicide news;Journal of Health Economics;2023-01