Affiliation:
1. Department of Economics, University of Michigan (email: )
Abstract
This paper studies robust predictions when players may have additional information in an otherwise standard seller-offer bargaining with private values. Players’ extra information gives rise to higher-order uncertainties about the underlying surplus. We show that the equilibrium outcomes in the frequent-offer limit depend critically on the nature of second-order uncertainty: (i) when the seller’s beliefs about the buyer’s values are public, the limiting equilibrium outcomes are efficient and any surplus division is possible; (ii) when the seller’s beliefs are private, any feasible and individually rational payoffs can be the limiting equilibrium payoffs.(JEL C78, D82, D83)
Publisher
American Economic Association
Subject
Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law,Geography, Planning and Development
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