Affiliation:
1. Brown University (email: )
Abstract
Can an uninformed mediator improve outcomes in a dynamic reputational bargaining model? I show that a simple communication protocol used by professional mediators, of announcing an agreement only if both parties privately accept its terms, can increase the payoffs of rational bargainers, but only if communication is noisy: the mediator must sometimes fail to suggest a deal even when both bargainers accept it. (JEL C78, D74, D83)
Publisher
American Economic Association
Subject
Economics and Econometrics
Cited by
9 articles.
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1. Biased Mediators in Conflict Resolution;American Law and Economics Review;2024-09-14
2. Reputational Bargaining with External Resolution Opportunities;Review of Economic Studies;2024-05-30
3. Shuttle diplomacy;Journal of Economic Theory;2024-03
4. Bargaining under almost complete information;Journal of Economic Theory;2023-12
5. Optimal Dynamic Mediation;Journal of Political Economy;2023-11-01