Abstract
Abstract
Recent discussions of cognitive enhancement often note that drugs and technologies that improve cognitive performance may do so at the risk of “cheapening” our resulting cognitive achievements (e.g., Kass, Life, liberty and the defense of dignity: the challenge for bioethics, Encounter Books, San Francisco, 2004; Agar, Humanity’s end: why we should reject radical enhancement, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2010; Sandel, The case against perfection. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2007; Sandel, The case against perfection: what’s wrong with designer children, bionic athletes, and genetic engineering?”. In: Holland (ed) Arguing about bioethics, Routledge, London, 2012; Harris in Bioethics 25:102–111, 2011). While there are several possible responses to this worry, we will highlight what we take to be one of the most promising—one which draws on a recent strand of thinking in social and virtue epistemology to construct an integrationist defence of cognitive enhancement. (e.g., Pritchard in Synthese 175:133–151, 2010; Palermos in Synthese 192:2955–2286, 2015; Clark in Synthese 192:3757–3375, 2015). According to such a line, there is—despite initial appearances to the contrary—no genuine tension between using enhancements to attain our goals and achieving these goals in a valuable way provided the relevant enhancement is appropriately integrated into the agent’s cognitive architecture (in some suitably specified way). In this paper, however, we show that the kind of integration recommended by such views will likely come at a high cost. More specifically, we highlight a dilemma for users of pharmacological cognitive enhancement: they can (1) meet the conditions for cognitive integration (and on this basis attain valuable achievements) at the significant risk of dangerous dependency, or (2) remain free of such dependency while foregoing integration and the valuable achievements that such integration enables. After motivating and clarifying the import of this dilemma, we offer recommendations for how future cognitive enhancement research may offer potential routes for navigating past it.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
Psychiatry and Mental health,Health Policy,Neurology
Reference61 articles.
1. Clarke, Steve, Julian Savulescu, Tony Coady, Alberto Giubilini, and Sagar Sanyal, eds. 2016. The Ethics of human enhancement: Understanding the debate. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
2. Juengst, Eric. and Daniel Moseley. 2016. Human enhancement. In The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy, E Zalta ed.
3. Persson, Ingmar, and Julian Savulescu. 2008. The perils of cognitive enhancement and the urgent imperative to enhance the moral character of humanity. Journal of Applied Philosophy 25 (3): 162–177.
4. Persson, Ingmar, and Julian Savulescu. 2012. Unfit for the future: The need for moral enhancement. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
5. Kraemer, Felicitas. 2011. Authenticity anyone? The enhancement of emotions via neuro-psychopharmacology. Neuroethics 4 (1): 51–64.
Cited by
4 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献,注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献,订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献