Abstract
AbstractDoes ASEAN play a role in managing security issues in Southeast Asia and beyond? This chapter introduces the book’s core argument that, since the 1990s, ASEAN and ASEAN-led institutions have individually devised and/or shifted their own institutional strategy to manage the great-power politics pertaining to the South China Sea disputes, and that each institutional strategy aims to constrain great powers’ behavior and avoid being entrapped by their strategic competition so as to ensure member states’ interests. Strategy creation or shifts generally occur when member states perceive a change in the strategic environment relating to the South China Sea. But when ASEAN faces difficulty changing its strategy, it establishes a new institution to expand its strategic tools, which assumes a different functionality, geopolitical scope, and raison d'être. In doing so, ASEAN nurtures a quasi-division of labor among its institutions to manage the great-power politics in the South China Sea.
Publisher
Springer Nature Singapore
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