1. Barnes, B. and Bloor, D. (1982), “Relativism, Rationalism, and the Sociology of Knowledge,” 21–47, in M. Hollis and S. Lukes (eds.), Rationality and Relativism (Cambridge MA: MIT Press). In this chapter, and Bloor define relativism as “disinterested inquiry.” It is unlikely that Daniel Dennett or any of the philosophers who associate STS science studies with relativism have read this piece, or the defense of science and “objective reality” one finds in the writings of all the key founders of STS including the realist philosophers most prominent target, Harry Collins.
2. Biagioli, M. (1996), “From Relativism to Contingentism,” 189–206, in P. Galison and D.J. Stump (eds.), The Disunity of Science: Boundaries, Contexts, and Power (Stanford: Stanford University Press).
3. Bloor, D. (1976), Knowledge and Social Imagery (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul).
4. Bohm, D. (1976), Fragmentation and Wholeness: An Inquiry into the Function of Language and Thought (New York: Humanities Press).
5. Campbell, D.T. (1974), “Unjustified variation and retention in scientific discovery,” 141–161, in F. Jose Ayala and T. Dobzhansky (eds.), Studies in the philosophy of biology: Reduction and related problems (London/Bastingstoke: Macmillan).