Machinic Phylum and Architecture-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Machinic Phylum and Architecture

Published:2021 Issue: Volume: Page:3-16
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Container-title:Proceedings of the 2020 DigitalFUTURES
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Author:

Radman Andrej

Abstract

AbstractThe chapter draws on the anti-substantivist and anti-hylomorphic legacy of two significant Deleuze and Guattari’s interlocutors: Raymond Ruyer and Gilbert Simondon. Ruyer vehemently opposed the logic of mechanicism without regressing to (active) vitalism. His masterpiece Neofinalism, yet to be fully appreciated in architectural circles, is an ode to multiplicity or ‘absolute form’. The title is to be read as a challenge to the hegemony of the step-by-step causation and partes-extra-partes mereology. According to Ruyer, non-locality is the key, not only to the question of subjectivity, but to the problem of life itself. Simondon too shies away from the metaphysics of presence. For him, the process of individuation cannot be grasped on the basis of the fully formed individual. In other words, the knowledge of individuation is the individuation of knowledge. Simondon’s highest ambition in On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects was to integrate culture and technics (tekhne). The conviction that culture need not be antagonistic to technology is particularly pertinent to the ecologies of architecture. In the second half of the chapter, the affordance theory meets contemporary neurosciences.

Publisher

Springer Singapore

Link

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/978-981-33-4400-6_1

Reference62 articles.

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3. The term ‘simple location’ was coined by Alfred North Whitehead. It designates the fallacy of the attempt to locate concrete particulars in definite portions of space and time. See: Whitehead, A.N.: Science and the Modern World. Pelican Mentor Books, New York (1948)

4. Neo- or quasi-finalism is akin to Spinoza’s ‘conatus’ and Nietzsche’s ‘will to power’. See: Ruyer, R.: Neofinalism. Minnesota University Press, Minneapolis (2016)

5. Ruyer, R.: Neofinalism, p. 94. Minnesota University Press, Minneapolis (2016). The self-contained, sovereign subject is but a ‘zombie concept’. Such concepts “carry a presuppositional force of such staying power that they tend to return no matter how many times you slay them.” See: Massumi, B.: Immediation unlimited. In. Manning, E., Munster, A., Stavning Thomsen, B.M. (eds.) Immediation II, pp. 501–43 (502). Open Humanities Press, London (2019)