Abstract
AbstractDistributed Nash equilibrium seeking of aggregative games is investigated and a continuous-time algorithm is proposed. The algorithm is designed by virtue of projected gradient play dynamics and aggregation tracking dynamics, and is applicable to games with constrained strategy sets and weight-balanced communication graphs. The key feature of our method is that the proposed projected dynamics achieves exponential convergence, whereas such convergence results are only obtained for non-projected dynamics in existing works on distributed optimization and equilibrium seeking. Numerical examples illustrate the effectiveness of our methods.
Funder
National Natural Science Foundation of China
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
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