1. W. V. Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,”Philosophical Review, 60:20–43 (1951); see especially pp. 23f.
2. This paper presupposes the explication of logical truth, which will be indicated in §2, and that of the distinction between logical and descriptive constants (compareIntroduction to Semantics, §13). Our present task is only to solve the additional problem involved in the explication of analyticity.
3. The great difficulties and complications of any attempt to explicate logical concepts for natural languages have been clearly explained by Benson Mates in “Analytic Sentences,”Philosophical Review, 60:525–34 (1951), and Richard Martin, “On ‘Analytic’,”Philosophical Studies, 3:42–47 (1952). Both articles offer strong arguments against the view held by Quine and Morton G. White that there is no clear distinction between analytic and synthetic (Quine, op. cit.; White, “The Analytic and the Synthetic: An Untenable Dualism,” inJohn Dewey: Philosopher of Science and Freedom, New York, 1952).
4. CompareLogical Syntax of Language, §34c.
5. See, for example, J. Cooley,Primer of Formal Logic (1942), p. 153.