Does Legal Origin Matter for Arms Control Treaty Ratification?

Abstract

AbstractThis chapter examines whether the legal origin of a country influences the likelihood of ratification of multilateral international treaties concerning arms control. We theorize that ratification of an arms control treaty signals a country’s intention to avoid arms races and wars. We know only little about the variation in the ratification of such agreements. One possible element that may explain this variation is the legal origin or tradition of a country. Since treaties are legally binding agreements between two or more states and/or international governmental organizations, they cannot be adapted to local needs and circumstances. Treaties are therefore generally an uneasy fit with the gradual, organic evolution of law that is essential in the common-law system. By contrast, the civil-law tradition neatly distinguishes between legally binding obligations and non-binding guidelines or directives. Consequently, civil-law countries are expected to be more likely to ratify treaties than common-law countries. The empirical results clearly confirm this expectation. In particular, civil-law countries have ratified about nine percent more treaties than common-law countries.