Abstract
AbstractIndeed, deterrence, as Freedman and Mazarr recount in this volume in respectively Chaps. 10.1007/978-94-6265-419-8_1 and 10.1007/978-94-6265-419-8_2, aims to dissuade an opponent from taking undesirable actions. Clear communication of demands (a red line for instance), coupled with a credible threat to inflict pain if necessary, and demonstration of resolve are some obvious essential elements for creating effective deterrence. Success crucially also depends on whether the opponent receives the intended signal, interprets it as intended, and has the perception that the message is congruent with reality, i.e., that the opponent can make good on her threats. Success furthermore assumes that the demands communicated are acceptable. If those prerequisites exist, theory suggests a rational actor will back down, after weighing the benefits of the envisioned actions versus the potential costs that may result when the threat is executed. This chapter offers a synthesis of insights that have appeared since the 1980s that fundamentally challenge that assumption of rationality. This contribution about the workings of the human mind concerns the various filters and cognitive shortcuts that colour the incoming stream of information and the processes to digest it and come to a decision.
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