1. Ernan McMullin, “Recent Work in Philosophy of Science”,New Scholasticism, XL (1966), 478–518; esp. p. 509. (Professor McMullin informs us that he is presently preparing a follow-up report for the same journal.) See also B. van Fraassen and H. Margenau, “Philosophy of Science”, inContemporary Philosophy: A Survey, Volume 2, R. Klibanski, ed., (Firenze: La Nuova Italia Editrice, 1968).
2. Ernan McMullin, “Recent Work in Philosophy of Science”, p. 504.
3. Israel Scheffler,Science and Subjectivity, (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, (1967). Dudley Shapere,Philosophical Problems of Natural Science, (New York: MacMillan, 1965) and “Meaning and Scientific Change”,Pittsburgh Series III (1966), pp. 41–85. Complete bibliographical data for all series books are listed in Appendix I.
4. Particularly since a report on philosophy of science in Canada is scheduled to appear in this journal in the near future, discussion of this connection wills of course be restricted to only the absolutely essential.
5. John Passmore, “Logical Positivism”, inThe Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Volume V, Paul Edwards, general editor, (New York: MacMillan and the Free Press, 1967), pp. 52–57. The precise passage from Passmore's article reads as follows: “Logical positivism, considered as the doctrine of a sect, has disintegrated. In various ways it has been absorbed into the international movement of contemporary empiricism, within which the disputes which divided it are still being fought out. Originally, it set up a series of sharp contrasts: between metaphysics and science, logical and factural truths, the verifiable and the nonverifiable, the corrigible and the incorrigible, what can be shown and what can be said, facts and theories. In recent philosophy, all these contrasts have come under attack, not from metaphysicians but from philosophers who would in a general sense be happy enough to describe themselves as “logical empiricists”. Even among those philosophers who would still wish to make the contrasts on which the logical positivists insisted, few would believe that they can be made with the sharpness of the ease which the logical positivists at first suggested. Logical positivism, then, is dead, or as dead as a philosophical movement ever becomes. But it has left a legacy behind” (p. 56).