1. See e.g. for the economic analysis of fault, M. Faure, Fault. Economic Analysis, in: P. Widmer (ed.), Unification of Tort Law: Fault (2004); for strict liability, M. Faure, Strict liability. Economic analysis, in: B.A. Koch/H. Koziol (eds.), Strict Liability (2002), 361–394; for contributory negligence M. Faure, Economic analysis of contributory negligence, in: U. Magnus/M. Martin-Casals (eds.), Unification of tort law: contributory negligence (2004), 233–256 and for environmental liability M. Faure/D. Grimeaud, Financial assurance issues of environmental liability, in: M. Faure (ed.), Deterrence, insurability, and compensation in environmental liability. Future developments in the European Union (2003), 7–255.
2. These arguments have also been discussed in M. Faure/ D. Grimeaud (supra fn. 1), 180–193 with respect to environmental liability insurance.
3. More particularly by S. Shavell, The judgement proof problem, [1986] International Review of Law and Economics (IRLE), 43–58.
4. P.J. Jost, Limited liability and the requirement to purchase insurance, [1999] IRLE, 259–276. A similar argument has recently been formulated by M. Polborn, Mandatory Insurance and the Judgement-Proof Problem, [1998] IRLE, 141–146 and by G. Skogh, Mandatory Insurance: Transaction Costs Analysis of Insurance, in: B. Bouckaert/G. de Geest (eds.), Encyclopedia of Law and Economics (2000), 521–537. Skogh has also pointed out that compulsory insurance may save on transaction costs.
5. See also H. Kunreuther/ P. Freeman, Insurability, environmental risks and the law, in: A. Heyes (ed.), The Law and Economics of the Environment (2001), 316.