Author:
Bian Xun,Waller Bennie D.,Yavas Abdullah
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
Urban Studies,Economics and Econometrics,Finance,Accounting
Reference23 articles.
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5. Clauretie, T. M., & Daneshvary, N. (2008). Principal-agent conflict and broker effort near listing contract expiration: the case of residential properties. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 37(2), 147–61.
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