1. H. P. Stapp:Amer. Journ. Phys.,40, 1098 (1972).
2. J. S. Bell:Physics,1, 195 (1964);H. P. Stapp:Phys. Rev. D,3, 1303 (1971), Sect.3;Correlation Experiments and the Nonvalidity of Ordinary Ideas about the Physical World (Berkeley, Cal., 1968);J. F. Clauser andM. A. Horne:Phys. Rev. D,10, 526 (1974). The statement of Bell's result given in the text is based on the results obtained in the second of the above references, where it is tacitly assumed that counter efficiences are not limited in principle. The principle of local causes is introduced and analyzed in those two works.
3. S. J. Freedman andJ. F. Clauser:Phys. Rev. Lett.,28, 938 (1972).
4. A. N. Whitehead:Process and Reality (New York, N. Y., 1929). Whitehead's theory differs from mine in at least two important respects. First, it rejects the serial or sequential ordering of events (or actual occasions or actual entities), and consequently is forced to the complication of a «contemporary world» comprised of an ill-defined multiplicity of actual entities. This complication in Whitehead's theory was engendered by precisely the notion of causality invalidated by Bell's theorem. Reversion to the serial notion restores unity to the world, thereby eliminating a serious structural and aesthetic defect in Whitehead's model. A second important difference is thatWhitehead describes details of the decision-making process, whereas I described general mathematical conditions on this process, thus securing a well-defined connection to mathematical physics.
5. H. P. Stapp: inCausality and physical theories, AIP Conference Proceedings, No. 16, edited byW. B. Rolnick, American Institute of Physics;D. Iagolnitzer andH. P. Stapp:Comm. Math. Phys.,14, 15 (1969).