Abstract
AbstractFault injection attacks (FIA), which cause information leakage by injecting intentional faults into the data or operations of devices, are one of the most powerful methods compromising the security of confidential data stored on these devices. Previous studies related to FIA report that attackers can skip instructions running on many devices through many means of fault injection. Most existing anti-FIA countermeasures on software are designed to secure against instruction skip (IS). On the other hand, recent studies report that attackers can use laser fault injection to manipulate instructions running on devices as they want. Although the previous studies have shown that instruction manipulation (IM) could attack the existing countermeasures against IS, no effective countermeasures against IM have been proposed. This paper is the first work tackling this problem, aiming to construct software-based countermeasures against IM faults. Evaluating program vulnerabilities to IM faults is required to consider countermeasures against IM faults. We propose three IM simulation environments for that aim and compare them to reveal their performance difference. GDB (GNU debugger)-based simulator that we newly propose in this paper outperforms the QEMU-based simulator that we presented in AICCSA:1–8, 2020 in advance, in terms of evaluation time at most $$\times$$
×
400 faster. Evaluating a target program using the proposed IM simulators reveals that the IM faults leading to attack successes are classified into four classes. We propose secure coding techniques as countermeasures against IMs of each four classes and show the effectiveness of the countermeasures using the IM simulators.
Funder
New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
Computer Networks and Communications,Software