The case against lawyers’ contingent fees and the misapplication of principal-agent models-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

The case against lawyers’ contingent fees and the misapplication of principal-agent models

Published:2011-04-11 Issue:2 Volume:32 Page:263-292
ISSN:0929-1261
Container-title:European Journal of Law and Economics
language:en
Short-container-title:Eur J Law Econ

Author:

Sacconi Lorenzo

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Subject

Law,Economics and Econometrics,Business and International Management

Link

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10657-011-9243-x.pdf

Reference49 articles.

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3. Brickman, L. (2003). The continuing assault on the citadel of fiduciary protection: Ethics 2000’s revision of model rule 1.5. University of Illinois Law Review, 5, 1181–1216.

4. Cassone, A., & Ramello, G. B. (2011). The simple economics of class action: Private provision of club and public goods. European Journal of Law and Economics (forthcoming).

5. Cenini, M., Luppi, B., & Parisi, F. (2011). Incentive effects of class actions and punitive damages under alternative procedural regimes. European Journal of Law and Economics (forthcoming)

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