A note on antitrust damages and leniency programs-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

A note on antitrust damages and leniency programs

Published:2011-04-30 Issue:3 Volume:33 Page:691-699
ISSN:0929-1261
Container-title:European Journal of Law and Economics
language:en
Short-container-title:Eur J Law Econ

Author:

Silbye Frederik

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Subject

Law,Economics and Econometrics,Business and International Management

Link

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10657-011-9246-7.pdf

Reference10 articles.

1. Aubert, C., Rey, P., & Kovacic, W. (2006). The impact of leniency and whistle-blowing programs on cartels. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 24(6), 1241–1266.

2. Barnett, T. O. (2007). Global antitrust enforcement. Address at the Georgetown Law Global Antitrust Enforcement Symposium, September 26.

3. Chen, J., & Harrington, J. (2007). The impact of the corporate leniency program on cartel formation and the cartel price path. In V. Ghosal & J. Stennek (Eds.), The political economy of antitrust. Amsterdam: Elsevier.

4. Connor, J. (2003). Private international cartels: Effectiveness, welfare, and anticartel enforcement. Staff paper # 03-12, Purdue University.

5. European Commission. (2008). White paper—damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules. COM(2008) 165.

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