Abstract
AbstractAnalytical security of cryptographic protocols does not immediately translate to operational security due to incorrect implementation and attacks targeting the execution environment. Code verification and hardware-based trusted execution solutions exist, however these leave it up to the implementer to assemble the complete solution, imposing a complete re-think of the hardware platforms and software development process. We rather aim for a comprehensive solution for secure cryptographic protocol execution, which takes the form of a trusted execution environment based on runtime verification and stock hardware security modules. RV-TEE can be deployed on existing platforms and protocol implementations. Runtime verification lends itself well at several conceptual levels of the execution environment, ranging from high level protocol properties, to lower level checks such as taint inference. The proposed architectural setup involving two runtime verification modules is instantiated through a case study using a popular web browser. We successfully monitor high and low level properties with promising results with respect to practicality.
Funder
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
Computational Theory and Mathematics,Hardware and Architecture,Software,Computer Science (miscellaneous)
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