Partition Equilibrium Always Exists in Resource Selection Games-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Partition Equilibrium Always Exists in Resource Selection Games

Published:2013-04-04 Issue:1 Volume:53 Page:73-85
ISSN:1432-4350
Container-title:Theory of Computing Systems
language:en
Short-container-title:Theory Comput Syst

Author:

Anshelevich Elliot,Caskurlu Bugra,Hate Ameya

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Subject

Computational Theory and Mathematics,Theoretical Computer Science

Link

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s00224-013-9463-2.pdf

Reference15 articles.

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2. Awerbuch, B., Azar, Y., Epstein, L.: The price of routing unsplittable flow. In: Proceedings of the Thirty-Seventh Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pp. 57–66. ACM, New York (2005)

3. Durr, C., Thang, N.K.: Non-clairvoyant scheduling games. Theory Comput. Syst. 49(1), 3–23 (2011)

4. LNCS;M. Feldman,2009

5. LNCS;A. Fiat,2007

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