Informed principal, moral hazard, and limited liability
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Springer Science and Business Media LLC
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http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s40505-021-00201-3.pdf
Reference10 articles.
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4. Karle, Heiko, Schumacher, Heiner, Staat, Christian: Signaling quality with increased incentives. Euro. Econ. Rev. 85, 8–21 (2016)
5. Maskin, Eric, Tirole, Jean: The principal-agent relationship with an informed principal: the case of private values. Econometrica 58(2), 379–409 (1990)
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