Abstract
AbstractTsui and Weymark (Econ Theory 10:241–256, 1997, https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050156) have shown that the only continuous social welfare orderings on the whole Euclidean space which satisfy the weak Pareto principle and are invariant to individual-specific similarity transformations of utilities are strongly dictatorial. Their proof relies on functional equation arguments which are quite complex. This note provides a simpler proof of their theorem.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Reference13 articles.
1. Arrow, K.: Social Choice and Individual Values. Wiley, New York (1951)
2. Baccelli, J.: Interpersonal comparisons of what? J. Philos. (forthcoming)
3. Blackorby, C., Donaldson, D., Weymark, J.A.: Social choice with interpersonal utility comparisons: a diagrammatic introduction. Int. Econ. Rev. 25(2), 327–356 (1984). https://doi.org/10.2307/2526200
4. Blackorby, C., Donaldson, D., Weymark, J.A.: A Welfarist proof of Arrow’s theorem. Recherches Économiques de Louvain 56(3/4), 259–286 (1990)
5. Bossert, W., Weymark, J.A.: Utility in social choice. In: Barberà, S., Hammond, P.J., Seidl, C. (eds.) Handbook of Utility Theory, vol. 2, pp. 1099–1177. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-7964-1_7