Abstract
AbstractThis paper studies a simple model of a repeated cartel that can punish using both voluntary fines and inefficient prices wars. The idea is to use the fines in response to noisy signals of bad behavior and back it up with threats of price wars in response to the easily observed failure to pay the voluntary fines. The model is shown to deliver the insights of modern repeated game theory in an empirically accurate and tractable form.
Funder
MIUR
European University Institute - Fiesole
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
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