On the structure of minimal winning coalitions in simple voting games-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

On the structure of minimal winning coalitions in simple voting games

Published:2009-07-08 Issue:3 Volume:34 Page:429-440
ISSN:0176-1714
Container-title:Social Choice and Welfare
language:en
Short-container-title:Soc Choice Welf

Author:

Axenovich Maria,Roy Sonali

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Subject

Economics and Econometrics,Social Sciences (miscellaneous)

Link

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s00355-009-0408-2.pdf

Reference22 articles.

1. Barua R, Chakravarty SR, Roy S, Sarkar P (2004) A characterization and some properties of the Banzhaf-Coleman-Dubey-Shapley sensitivity index. Games Econ Behav 49: 31–48

2. Berge C (1988) Hypergraphs. Selected topics in graph theory. Academic Press, San Diego, pp 189–206

3. Carreras F, Freixas J (1996) Complete simple games. Math Soc Sci 32: 139–155

4. Coleman JS (1971) Control of collectivities and the power of a collectivity to act. In: Leberman B (eds) Social choice. Gordon and Breach, New York

5. Engel K (1997) Sperner theory. Cambridge University Press, London

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