Borda’s Paradox with weighted scoring rules-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Borda’s Paradox with weighted scoring rules

Published:2011-01-06 Issue:1 Volume:38 Page:121-136
ISSN:0176-1714
Container-title:Social Choice and Welfare
language:en
Short-container-title:Soc Choice Welf

Author:

Diss Mostapha,Gehrlein William V.

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Subject

Economics and Econometrics,Social Sciences (miscellaneous)

Link

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s00355-010-0522-1.pdf

Reference23 articles.

1. Berg S (1985) Paradox of voting under an urn model: the effect of homogeneity. Public Choice 47: 377–387

2. Bezembinder T (1996) The plurality majority converse under single peakedness. Soc Choice Welf 13: 365–380

3. Cervone D, Gehrlein WV, Zwicker W (2005) Which scoring rule maximizes Condorcet efficiency under IAC?. Theory Decis 58: 145–185

4. Colman AM, Poutney I (1978) Borda’s voting paradox: theoretical likelihood and electoral occurrences. Behav Sci 23: 15–20

5. de Borda J (1784) A paper on elections by ballot. In: Sommerlad F, McLean I (eds) The political theory of Condorcet. Working paper (trans: 1989). University of Oxford, Oxford, pp 122–129

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