Majority rule and selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules with discrete skill levels-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Majority rule and selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules with discrete skill levels

Published:2019-04-13 Issue:2-3 Volume:54 Page:337-362
ISSN:0176-1714
Container-title:Social Choice and Welfare
language:en
Short-container-title:Soc Choice Welf

Author:

Brett Craig,Weymark John A.

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Subject

Economics and Econometrics,Social Sciences (miscellaneous)

Link

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s00355-019-01188-4.pdf

Reference31 articles.

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3. Bierbrauer FJ, Boyer PC (2017) Politically feasible reforms of non-linear tax systems. Working Paper No. 6573, CES/Ifo

4. Black D (1948) On the rationale of group decision making. J Polit Econ 56:23–34

5. Bohn H, Stuart C (2013) Revenue extraction by median voters, unpublished manuscript. Department of Economics, University of California, Santa Barbara

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