Fictitious-Transfer Solutions in Cooperative Game Theory-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Fictitious-Transfer Solutions in Cooperative Game Theory

Published:1992 Issue: Volume: Page:13-33
ISSN:
Container-title:Rational Interaction
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Author:

Myerson Roger B.

Publisher

Springer Berlin Heidelberg

Link

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/978-3-662-09664-2_3

Reference29 articles.

1. Aumann, R. J. [ 1967 ]. “A Survey of Cooperative Games Without Side Payments.” In M. Shubik, ed., Essays in Mathematical Economics pp. 3–27. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

2. Aumann, R. J. [ 1985 ]. “An Axiomatization of the Non-Transferable Utility Value.” Econometrica 53:599–612.

3. Aumann, R. J., and B. Peleg [ 1960 ]. “Von Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions to Cooperative Games Without Sidepayments.” Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society 66:173–179.

4. Harsanyi, J. C. [ 1959 ]. “A Bargaining Model for the Cooperative n-Person Game.” In R. D. Luce and A. W. Tucker, eds., Contributions to the Theory of Games IV Princeton: Princeton University Press, pages 325–355.

5. Harsanyi, J. C. [ 1963 ]. “A Simplified Bargaining Model for the n-Person Cooperative Game.” International Economic Review 4:194–220.

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