1. Reported by M. O’C. Drury in “Conversations with Wittgenstein”, in Rush Rhees, editor, Ludwig Wittgenstein: Personal Recollections,Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1981, pp. 112–189, especially p. 131.
2. See, e.g., the papers by Follesdal and his associates reprinted in Hubert L. Dreyfus, editor, Husserl: Intentionality and Cognitive Science, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1982. For a presentation and interesting development of Follesdal’s ideas, see also David W. Smith and Ronald McIntyre, Husserl and Intentionality, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1982. Cf. also J.N. Mohanty, Edmund Husserl’s Theory of Meaning, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1976.
3. Cf. here Leila Haaparanta, Frege’s Doctrine of Being (Acta Philosophica Fennica vol. 39) Societas Philosophica Fennica, Helsinki 1985, especially pp. 102–107.
4. See in the first place Bertrand Russell, “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, N.S., vol. 11 (1910–11), pp. 108–128; Our Knowledge of the External World, Allen and Unwin, London, 1914; “On the Nature of Acquaintance”, The Monist, vol. 24 (1914), pp. 1–16, 161–187, 435–453. Cf. also Jaakko Hintikka, “Knowledge by Acquaintance, Individuation by Acquaintance”, in David Pears, editor, Bertrand Russell: A Collection of Critical Essays. Doubleday, Garden City, N. Y., 1972, pp. 52–70.
5. This fact is amply in evidence in Russell’s writings published in the period in question (see note 4 above), but it is even more patent in Bertrand Russsell, Theory of Knowledge: The 1913 Manuscript (E.R. Eames, editor), Allen and Unwin, London, 1984 (vol. 7 of Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell).