Lucky Microseconds: A Timing Attack on Amazon’s s2n Implementation of TLS-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Lucky Microseconds: A Timing Attack on Amazon’s s2n Implementation of TLS

Published:2016 Issue: Volume: Page:622-643
ISSN:0302-9743
Container-title:Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2016
language:
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Author:

Albrecht Martin R.,Paterson Kenneth G.

Publisher

Springer Berlin Heidelberg

Link

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/978-3-662-49890-3_24

Reference19 articles.

1. Almeida, J.B., Barbosa, M., Barthe, G., Dupressoir, F.: Verifiable side-channel security of cryptographic implementations: constant-time MEE-CBC. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2015:1241 (2015)

2. AlFardan, N.J., Bernstein, D.J., Paterson, K.G., Poettering, B., Schuldt, J.C.N.: On the security of RC4 in TLS. In: King, S.T. (ed.) Proceedings of the 22nd USENIX Security Symposium, Washington D.C., USA, pp. 305–320. USENIX, August 2013

3. Apecechea, G.I., Inci, M.S., Eisenbarth, T., Sunar, B.: Lucky 13 strikes back. In: Bao, F., Miller, S., Zhou, J., Ahn, G.-J. (eds.) Proceedings of the 10th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security, ASIA CCS 2015, Singapore, April 14–17, pp. 85–96. ACM (2015)

4. AlFardan, N., Paterson, K.G.: Plaintext-recovery attacks against datagram TLS. In: Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS 2012) (2012)

5. AlFardan, N., Paterson, K.G.: Lucky thirteen: breaking the TLS and DTLS record protocols. In: Sommer, R. (ed.) Proceedings of the 2013 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P 2013), San Diego, CA, USA, pp. 526–540. IEEE Press, May 2013

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