1. Aziz, H., Biró, P., Gaspers, S., de Haan, R., Mattei, N., Rastegari, B.: Stable matching with uncertain linear preferences. Technical Report 1607.02917, Cornell University Library.
http://arxiv.org/abs/1607.02917
2. Drummond, J., Boutilier, C.: Preference elicitation and interview minimization in stable matchings. In: Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pp. 645–653 (2014)
3. Ehlers, L., Massó, J.: Matching markets under (in)complete information. J. Econ. Theor. 157, 295–314 (2015)
4. Gusfield, D., Irving, R.: The Stable Marriage Problem: Structure and Algorithms. MIT Press, Cambridge (1989)
5. Halldórsson, M.M., Iwama, K., Miyazaki, S., Yanagisawa, H.: Improved approximation results for the stable marriage problem. ACM Trans. Algorithms 3(3), 30 (2007)