Behavioural and Welfare Analysis of an Intermediary in Biodiversity Offset Markets

Abstract

AbstractThis paper provides a behavioural and welfare analysis of an intermediary in biodiversity offset markets. These markets are characterised by high information requirements and transaction costs, threatening economic efficiency and even biodiversity outcomes. Specialised intermediaries facilitate trading by providing information and brokering services. By buying, holding and selling offset credits from storage, the intermediary can decrease both financial and ecological risks in the market. As a drawback, the intermediary may exploit market power upstream or downstream due to ecological features of the offset market. Intermediaries decrease the trading parties’ transaction costs by offering specialised information, reduce uncertainty, and decrease the costs of offsetting by increasing liquidity in the market and offering certain offset credits. When the intermediary has market power, selling and buying prices deviate from the competitive equilibrium. This welfare loss may be lower than the loss from transaction costs and trade ratios in decentralised trade, even in the case of the intermediary having both monopoly and monopsony power. The intermediary is the most useful when trade ratios are high and when the intermediary stores mature credits, which eliminates ecological uncertainty and thereby offers cost savings for developers, and may result in a higher level of biodiversity.