Author:
Quaas Martin,Skonhoft Anders
Abstract
AbstractSmall-scale fisheries often operate under conditions of regulated open access; that is, the fishery is subject to natural or regulatory constraints on fishing technology, including regulations of fishing gear and fishing practices, but typically there is no direct regulation of catches. We study how an increase in harvesting efficiency changes the different components of welfare—consumer surplus and producer surplus—in such a regulated open-access fishery, taking t the feedback of harvesting on stock dynamics, i.e. the dynamic common-pool resource externality into account. We find that both components of welfare change in the same direction. If, and only if, initial efficiency is low enough so that there is no maximum sustainable yield (MSY) overfishing, an improvement of harvesting efficiency increases welfare.
Funder
NTNU Norwegian University of Science and Technology
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law,Economics and Econometrics
Reference34 articles.
1. Anderson L (1986) The economics of fisheries management. John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore
2. Arkolakis C, Demidova S, Klenow PJ, Rodriguez-Clare A (2008) Endogenous variety and the gains from trade. Am Econ Rev 98(2):444–450
3. Arkolakis C, Costinot A, Rodríguez-Clare A (2012) New trade models, same old gains? Am Econ Rev 102(1):94–130
4. Baland J-M, Francois P (2005) Commons as insurance and the welfare impact of privatization. J Public Econ 89(2–3):211–231
5. Clark CW (1990) Mathematical bioeconomics, 2nd edn. Wiley, New York
Cited by
2 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献，注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献，订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献