1. See Charles Journet, The Meaning of Evil (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1963), pp. 117–118; H. J. McCloskey, God and Evil (The Hague: Martinus Nijihoff, 1974), p. 82; Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom and Evil (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1974), p. 61; George Schlesinger, Religion and Scientific Method (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1977), pp. 65, 72; Bruce Reichenbach, “Must God Create the Best Possible World?” International Philosophical Quarterly 19 (1979): 208; R. K. Perkins Jr, “McHarry's Theodicy: A Reply” Analysis 40 (1980), p. 171; Peter Forrest, “The Problem of Evil: Two Neglected Defences” Sophia 20 (1981), p. 52; William Hasker, “Must God Do His Best?” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 16 (1984), p. 213; Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 113–114; Philip L. Quinn, “God, Moral Perfection, and Possible Worlds” in Michael L. Peterson, ed., The Problem of Evil (Notre Dame, Ind: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), p. 294; Robert Elliot, “Divine Perfection, Axiology and the No Best World Defence” Religious Studies 29 (1993), p. 533; Daniel Howard-Snyder & Frances Howard-Snyder, “How an Unsurpassable Being Can Create a Surpassable World” Faith and Philosophy 11 (1994), p. 260.
2. Swinburne, op cit., p. 114.
3. Plantinga, op. cit., p. 61.
4. Elliot, op. cit., p. 533; cf Perkins Jr, op. cit., p. 171.
5. For happiness see Swinburne, op. cit., p. 114; George Schlesinger, New Perspectives on Old-Time Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 55. For virtue see Quinn, op. cit., p. 293; Osmond G. Ramberan, “God, Evil and the Idea of a Perfect World” Modern Schoolman 53 (1976), p. 392.