Rule of Law and the Criteria for Appointment of Judges: A Case for Judicial Virtues

Abstract

AbstractThis article seeks to develop a case for a virtue-oriented (or aretaic) approach to the criteria for appointing judges. It will argue for the usefulness of judicial virtue by showing its theoretical relevance for describing and explaining the criteria for selecting judicial candidates and claiming its advantage over the currently used syncretic sets of criteria used in European jurisdictions. The analysis will explore the connection between the criteria of judicial selection and the Rule of Law. If the Rule of Law is to be understood at its core as a process of tempering the arbitrariness of power, it requires certain personality traits of character on the part of the judiciary. This article argues that virtue is a context-relevant concept well-entrenched in legal culture that amounts to a personality aspect of the Rule of Law. In support of this point, the article discusses the two possible methods of establishing judicial virtues – using a targeted approach to virtue and an Aristotelian-inspired method of uncovering a catalogue of judicial virtues from the insights into the legal culture. The article concludes with policy-oriented advice on incorporating a virtue-centred approach to judicial selection processes.