Abstract
AbstractIn this essay, I argue that, all else being equal, theism is more probable than naturalism on the assumption that human beings are able to arrive at a body of moral knowledge that is largely accurate and complete. I put forth this thesis on grounds that, if naturalism is true, the explanation of the content of our moral intuitions terminates either in biological-evolutionary processes or in social conventions adopted for pragmatic reasons; that, if this is so, our moral intuitions were selected for their utility, not their truth; and that, if our moral intuitions were so selected, they are probably false. I defend the argument against three objections: first, that the argument amounts to a generic skeptical challenge; second, that ethical naturalism explains how our moral intuitions could have been selected for their truth; and third, that there is a pre-established harmony between the utility of moral beliefs and their truth-values.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Reference29 articles.
1. Arvan, M. (2021). Morality as an Evolutionary Exaptation. In J. De Smedt & H. De Cruz (Eds.), Empirically Engaged Evolutionary Ethics, Synthese Library (pp. 89–109). Springer International Publishing.
2. Audi, R. (1996). Intuitionism, Pluralism, and the Foundations of Ethics. In W. Sinnott-Armstrong & M. Timmons (Eds.), Moral Knowledge: New Readings in Moral Epistemology (pp. 101–136). Oxford University Press.
3. Baggett, D., & Walls, J. L. (2016). God and Cosmos: Moral Truth and Human Meaning. Oxford University Press.
4. Blackburn, S. (1993). How to be an Ethical Anti-Realist. In S. Blackburn (Ed.), Essays in Quasi-Realism (pp. 166–181). Oxford University Press.
5. Brosnan, K. (2011). Do the evolutionary origins of our moral beliefs undermine moral knowledge? Biology and Philosophy, 26, 51–64.
Cited by
2 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献,注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献,订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献