Abstract
AbstractAs a matter of fact, few, if any, theists have been expressivists about morality. This is probably because expressivism is thought to have unacceptable theological implications. That is, it is thought to imply (1) that God’s goodness depends on our desire-like states, (2) that God’s goodness is not a real property, (3) that it is not true that God is good, and (4) that God’s moral thoughts have no explanation. I argue that expressivism has no such implications and conclude that expressivism is theologically acceptable.
Funder
Arts and Humanities Research Council
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
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