Abstract
AbstractThe popularity of theodicy over the past several decades has given rise to a countermovement, “anti-theodicy”, which admonishes attempts at theodicy for various reasons. This paper examines one prominent anti-theodical objection: that it is hubristic, and attempts to form an approach to theodicy which evades this objection. To do so I draw from the work of Eleonore Stump, who provides a framework by which we can glean second-personal knowledge of God. From this knowledge, I argue that we can derive a theodicy which does not utilise the kind of analytic theorising anti-theodicists accuse of intellectual hubris.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
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