Abstract
AbstractThis paper develops an internal critique of Graham Oppy’s metaphilosophy of religion – his theories of argumentation, worldview comparison, and epistemic justification. First, it presents Oppy’s views and his main reasons in their favor. Second, it argues that Oppy is committed to two claims – that only truth-conducive reasons can justify philosophical belief and that such justification depends entirely on one’s judgments about the theoretical virtues of comprehensive worldviews – that jointly entail the unacceptable conclusion that philosophical beliefs cannot be justified. Third, it briefly argues that of his two claims, it is his thoroughgoing coherentism that should be rejected.
Funder
Central European University Private University
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
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