Abstract
AbstractIn this paper, I discuss Whiting’s (2021) account of rational belief and discuss some unresolved issues arising from its reliance on epistemic possibility and, by extension, perspective-relative aprioricity.
Funder
H2020 European Research Council
University of Zurich
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
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