Abstract
AbstractWe investigate a hitherto under-considered avenue of response for the logical pluralist to collapse worries. In particular, we note that standard forms of the collapse arguments seem to require significantorder-theoreticassumptions, namely that the collection of admissible logics for the pluralist should be closed undermeetsandjoins. We consider some reasons for rejecting this assumption, noting someprima facieplausible constraints on the class of admissible logics which would lead a pluralist admitting those logics to resist such closure conditions.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
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