Abstract
AbstractEva Schmidt argues that facts about incoherent beliefs can be non-evidential epistemic reasons to suspend judgment. In this commentary, I argue that incoherence-based reasons to suspend are epistemically superfluous: if the subjects in Schmidt’s cases ought to suspend judgment, then they should do so merely on the basis of their evidential reasons. This suggests a more general strategy to reduce the apparent normativity of coherence to the normativity of evidence. I conclude with some remarks on the independent interest that reasons-first epistemology might have within an evidentialist framework.
Funder
Schweizerischer Nationalfonds zur Förderung der Wissenschaftlichen Forschung
University of Zurich
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
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