Abstract
AbstractI’ll argue that one particular argument of Nāgārjuna’s against causation in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā deserves careful consideration from the perspective of contemporary western metaphysics. To show why this is the case, I’ll offer an interpretation of the key passages which differs from at least one popular reading. I’ll then aim to show that a whole swathe of metaphysical views about causation are problematic in light of Nāgārjuna’s argument, so interpreted. I’ll conclude, however, that one contemporary view in metaphysics has the means to respond to this argument: Ontic Structural Realism.
Funder
HORIZON EUROPE European Research Council
HORIZON EUROPE Marie Sklodowska-Curie Actions
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
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