Abstract
AbstractThis paper is about a problem that can arise when we try to harness the “wisdom of the crowd” from groups comprised of individuals who exhibit a certain kind of epistemic humility in the way they respond to testimonial evidence. I begin by setting out the problem and then make some initial steps toward solving it. The solution I develop is tentative and may not apply in all circumstances, but it promises to alleviate what seems to me to be a problem of both theoretical interest and practical importance.
Funder
Inland Norway University Of Applied Sciences
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Reference23 articles.
1. Barnett, Z. (2019). Philosophy without belief. Mind, 128, 109–138.
2. Barnett, Z. (ms). Five roles for inclination. Unpublished manuscript.
3. Christensen, D. (2007). Epistemology of disagreement: The good news. The Philosophical Review, 116, 187–217.
4. Daoust, M-K. (forthcoming). Optimizing individual and collective reliability: a puzzle. Social Epistemology. Online first.
5. Dellsén, F. (2020). The epistemic value of expert autonomy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 100, 344–361.
Cited by
1 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献，注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献，订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献