1. See also Section 57 and, for passages from the Three Dialogues, Berkeley, The Works of George Berkeley, A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop, eds. (Edinburgh: Nelson and Sons, 1949), II, 189–90
2. Works, II, 41, 175 and 249. See H. M. Bracken, “Berkeley and Malebranche on Ideas,” The Modem Schoolman, SLI (1963), 1–15.
3. This lesson, one of the foundations of their “realistic” interpretation of Berkeley, Luce and Jessop have tried to instill. See, for instance. Luce, Berkeley’s Immalerialism, (London: Nelson and Sons, 1945), pp. 40–47. Compare R. H. Popkin, “The New Realism of Bishop Berkeley,” in George Berkeley, eds. S. C. Pepper, K. Aschenbrenner, and B. Mates (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1957), pp. 1–10.
4. In both the Principles, Sections 38–39, and the Three Dialogues, Berkeley says that [his is why he uses “idea” to refer to what is given perceptually. Compare Works, II, 56–57, 235–36 and 250–51. Richard Watson, in his “The Breakdown of Cartesian Metaphysics,” Journal of the History of Philosophy, I (1963), 177–97
5. A disclaimer: I am not asserting that Berkeley succeeds in establishing C. The pain-heat identification argument, if sound, would establish C for the qualities in question, but the perceptual variations argument (e.g. the lukewarm water case) is at best grounds for a phenomenalistic analysis of, for example, “The same water seemed hot to my left hand, cold to my right.” The conclusion Berkeley draws that sensible qualities cannot occur un-perceived requires several additional assumptions. See my “Perceptual Relativity and Ideas in the Mind,” Philosophy and Phe-nomenological Research, XXIV (1963), 202–14, Watson, op. cit., 193–95, and E. B. Allaire, “Berkeley’s Idealism,” Theona, XXIX (1963), 229–44