1. Harriet Fast Scott and William Scott, The Armed Forces of the USSR (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), pp. 38–9.
2. John M. Caravelli, ‘The Role of Surprise and Preemption in Soviet Military Strategy’, International Security Review VI (Summer 1981), 209–36; Yossef Bodansky, ‘The Initial Period of War — Surprise and Special Operations’, Global Affairs I (Spring 1986);
3. Mark E. Miller, ‘Soviet Strategic Thought: the End of an Era?’, International Security Review V (Winter 1980–81), 491–6. James McConnell has qualified the Soviet dedication to pre-emption by noting that Soviet planners ‘value surprise and will do what they can to get it’, but that they also place a high value on being able to conduct long-term operations; ‘they are counting on stamina’, he argues, ‘more than surprise and blitzkrieg’. ‘SDI the Soviet Investment Debate and Soviet Military Policy’, Strategic Review XVI (Winter 1988).
4. Albert L. Weeks, ‘The Garthoff-Pipes Debate on Soviet Doctrine: Another Perspective’, Strategic Review XI (Winter 1983), 59;
5. Douglas M. Hart, ‘The Hermeneutics of Soviet Military Doctrine’, Washington Quarterly 17 (Spring 1984), 80–2.