1. See D. Schwartz, NATO’s Nuclear Dilemmas (Washington, DC, 1983); I. Daalder, The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response: NATO Strategy and Theater Nuclear Forces Since 1967 (New York, 1991).
2. For a more detailed description of Massive Retaliation see D. Rosenberg, ‘US Nuclear Warplanning, 1945–1960’, in D. Ball and J. Richelson (eds), Strategic Nuclear Targeting (Ithaca, NY, 1986).
3. This was so despite variations in the public presentation of policy. For example the notion of mutual assured destruction (MAD), which by the early 1970s was widely seen as characterising US strategy, had little impact on efforts to fine tune operational policy. See D. Ball, ‘The Development of the SIOP, 1960–1983’, in Ball and Richelson, Strategic Nuclear Targeting, op. cit.
4. For an overview of the development of US planning for flexible nuclear warhghting see Ball, ‘The Development of the SIOP’, op. cit.
5. See Schwartz, NATO’s Nuclear Dilemmas, op. cit.