1. N. V. Ogarkov, Istoriya uchit bditelnosti (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1985) ch. 3, passim.
2. J. M. Collins, US—Soviet Military Balance 1980–1985 ( PergamonBrassey’s International Defence Publishers, New York, 1985 ) p. 92.
3. B. Ye. Savkin, The Basic Principles of Operational Art and Tactics (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1972 ( USAF trans.)), and C. J. Dick, ‘Soviet Chemical Warfare Capabilities’.
4. N. I. Karkchiev, Toksikologiya OV i zashchita of oruzhiya massovogo porazheniya (Tashkent: Meditsine, 1973) 2nd edn, ch. 9, pp. 231–254, Raketnoe toplivo i tecknicheskie zhidkosti’ (taken from J. Erickson, ‘Soviet Chemical Warfare Capability’, p. 3).
5. See J. Hemsley, Soviet Troop Control (Brasseys, Pergamon Press, 1982), in particular ch. 8, passim pp. 169–182 for a detailed exposition covering the problems experienced by the Soviet Armed Forces following the introduction of operational and tactical automated C3 systems. Also J. T. Westwood, op. cit.